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Modern urban railways extensively use computerized sensing and control technologies to achieve safe, reli-
able, and well-timed operations. However, the use of these technologies may provide a convenient leverage
to cyber-attackers who have bypassed the air gaps and aim at causing safety incidents and service disrup-
tions. In this paper, we study false data injection (FDI) attacks against railways’ traction power systems
(TPSes). Specifically, we analyze two types of FDI attacks on the train-borne voltage, current, and position
sensor measurements – which we call efficiency attack and safety attack – that (i) maximize the system’s
total power consumption and (ii) mislead trains’ local voltages to exceed given safety-critical thresholds,
respectively. To counteract, we develop a global attack detection (GAD) system that serializes a bad data
detector and a novel secondary attack detector designed based on unique TPS characteristics. With intact
position data of trains, our detection system can effectively detect the FDI attacks on trains’ voltage and
current measurements even if the attacker has full and accurate knowledge of the TPS, attack detection,
and real-time system state. In particular, the GAD system features an adaptive mechanism that ensures
low false positive and negative rates in detecting the attacks under noisy system measurements. Extensive
simulations driven by realistic running profiles of trains verify that a TPS setup is vulnerable to the FDI at-
tacks, but these attacks can be detected effectively by the proposed GAD while ensuring a low false positive
rate.
1. INTRODUCTION
In modern cities, safe, reliable, and well-timed operations of urban railways are crit-
ical. A modern railway is a highly complex cyber-physical system (CPS) consisting of
diverse subsystems including train motion control, traction powering, signaling, etc,
where deeply embedded information and communication technologies (ICTs) are used
to operate each train and connect trains to an operation center. The extensive use of
ICT may provide a convenient leverage to attackers, however, who may aim to hurt
passengers’ safety or cause widespread service disruptions. To date, the cybersecurity
of modern railways has relied on air gaps that isolate their ICT systems from public
networks. However, recent high-profile intrusions such as Stuxnet [Karnouskos 2011]
and Dragonfly [Symantec 2014] have successfully breached the air gaps of critical CPS
infrastructures and resulted in physical damage. For instance, the Stuxnet worm dam-
aged nuclear centrifuges by injecting false control commands and forging normal sys-
tem states. Its design and architecture are not domain-specific – they can be readily
customized against other types of CPS including transportation [Karnouskos 2011].
Insider attacks represent another major threat to air-gapped systems; their severe
consequences have likewise been well documented [Security 2011]. It is thus critical to
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understand the cybersecurity risks of modern railways as a mission-critical CPS, and
develop effective security countermeasures in their ICT design.
In this paper, we study the cybersecurity of direct current (dc) traction power sys-
tems (TPSes) that are widely deployed in urban electrical railways. The criticality of
TPS is evidenced by prior severe incidents caused by TPS malfunctions. The 2014
Moscow metro derailment that led to 24 dead and 160 injured was caused by sudden
braking of the train in question, when its traction voltage dropped abruptly [Gabrielle
2014]. In Singapore, a system-wide metro service disruption, triggered by TPS faults,
affected almost half a million commuters during rush hours on July 7, 2015 [SMRT
2015]. Moreover, the computerized sensing and control in an automated TPS could be
prime targets for cyber-attackers, who can sabotage the control and steer the system
into inefficient and unsafe states.
Motivated by Stuxnet worm-type attacks that forge physical system states, in this
paper we study a general class of integrity attacks called false data injection (FDI),
which tampers with train-borne sensor measurements required by TPS control. In a
TPS, the electricity power supplied by substations is delivered by a network of over-
head lines and third rails to the trains. According to its operation mode, a train’s power
consumption can be highly dynamic. In traction mode, it draws power from the TPS,
causing a drop in the train’s local voltage; in braking mode, it regenerates electricity
from kinetic energy and injects this electricity back to the TPS,1 causing a rise in the
voltage. To prevent the voltage from exceeding safety-critical thresholds, trains apply
overcurrent control and squeeze control [Okada et al. 2004] to throttle their power draw
and injection, respectively. As these controls are performed based on train-borne volt-
age and current sensor measurements, FDI attacks on the measurements may mislead
the train into erroneous power control decisions, which may in turn produce damag-
ing and even catastrophic physical impacts on the train and the TPS. Recent results
show that the measurements can be compromised in practice by precisely controlled
electromagnetic interference in analog sensors [Kune et al. 2013], hardware trojans in
chips [Karri et al. 2010], and malware infections in sensor firmwares [McDaniel and
McLaughlin 2009; Depuru et al. 2011; Mike 2009]. Hence, FDI attack is a clear and
present threat that requires immediate attention.
In this paper, we aim to answer the following two fundamental research questions:
(1) How to characterize the impact of FDI attacks on TPS system efficiency and safety?
Analysis of the impact based on an essential TPS model will provide basic understand-
ing for developing countermeasures. However, the analysis is difficult, due to complex
system dynamics arising from the trains’ motion. In particular, a moving train does not
only act as “load” and “generation” alternately over time, but it also alters the power
network’s topology and electrical parameters continually. Moreover, because different
TPS components (trains, substations, etc.) become physically interconnected through
a common underlying power network, effects of an erroneous power control on a train
during attack may propagate to the neighboring TPS components. The analysis must
address these intricate and unique characteristics of TPSes.
(2) How to develop effective approaches for detecting the FDI attacks? Our thesis is
that, because measurements from different trains are inherently correlated through
interconnection over the same power network, for attack resilience we can apply a
global detection that cross-checks the measurements collected from all trains based on
an a priori global TPS model. However, in contrast to alternating current (ac) power
grids that have well-established centralized monitoring and sensor data cross-check
safeguards for reliable holistic control [Rahman et al. 2014; Liu et al. 2009], TPS
1In electrical railways, trains are often equipped with regenerative brakes that generate electricity in decel-
eration [Fletcher 1991].
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is mainly concerned with individual trains’ local operation (i.e., the overcurrent and
squeeze controls), and therefore it is not traditionally subject to any global sensor data
checks across trains. Thus, an existing dc TPS operation center seldom scrutinizes the
sensor measurements, beyond their display and presentation for human operators. In
this paper, we demonstrate the importance of these global, but hitherto ignored, sensor
data cross checks in the TPS domain against FDI attacks.
In answering the above two research questions, our main contributions in this paper
are as follows:
First, based on essential models of power substations, power flows, and train over-
current and squeeze controls in a TPS, we formulate two types of FDI attacks that
we call efficiency attack and safety attack. These attacks (i) maximize the total instan-
taneous power consumption of the TPS and (ii) mislead victim trains’ local voltages
to exceed given safety-critical thresholds, respectively. Efficiency attacks will increase
the train’s traction power consumption, resulting in an increase in railways’ opera-
tion expenses.2 Efficiency attacks will also potentially increase the carbon footprint
of the transportation sector, which is an important consideration for railway opera-
tors [Transport for London 2008]. On the other hand, safety attacks may trip circuit
breakers, causing dangerous power loss and brake malfunction.
The efficiency attack formulation models an aggressive attacker who aims at max-
imizing the attack impact and provides insights into understanding the performance
degradation limit caused by FDI attacks. Numerical results for a TPS section with
two substations and two trains show that the efficiency attack can result in an instan-
taneous efficiency loss of about 20%, whereas the safety attack on a single train can
indeed lead to significant safety breaches. These results substantiate the potency of
FDI attacks on train-borne sensor measurements.
Second, we propose to apply a global bad data detection (BDD) method, similar to
that widely used in ac power grids [Liu et al. 2009], to detect FDI attacks in a dc TPS.
Despite a known vulnerability of the BDD – it can be bypassed by an attacker who
knows enough details of its design – our numerical results show that, in order for an
FDI attack to be stealthy against the BDD, it will have to settle for a significantly
reduced damage on the system efficiency. Moreover, we observe that, given intact posi-
tion data of trains, solutions of the BDD bypass condition will become discrete. Based
on this observation, we develop a novel secondary attack detection (SAD) algorithm
that can effectively detect the onset of an FDI attack on trains’ voltage and current
measurements after it has bypassed the BDD. Hence, the BDD and the SAD form in
tandem a global attack detector (GAD) under the Kerckhoffs’s assumption (i.e., the
attacker has full and accurate knowledge of the system model, attack detection, and
real-time system state), provided that the integrity of trains’ position information can
be verified. Building on this result, we design an approach to mitigating the impact of
an attack after its detection.
Third, we report extensive simulations, driven by realistic profiles of trains in op-
eration, to evaluate our solutions. For a TPS consisting of four trains each running
over a distance of ten kilometers for 800 seconds, our results show that, without the
global BDD, FDI attacks can increase the total system energy consumption by 28.3%
and breach the system’s safety condition. After applying the BDD, the system’s total
energy consumption increases by no more than 6.2% under the efficiency attack, and
safety attacks become no longer successful. Moreover, the proposed SAD algorithm
2Energy costs of running urban rail pose a significant financial burden to transport companies, constituting
about 20% of their operational expenses [Osi 2015]. Of this, about 80% of energy is consumed for traction
(e.g. train’s motion, braking, electric losses) [Gonzlez-Gil et al. 2014].
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achieves a detection probability of 96% in detecting the onsets of the FDI attacks that
have successfully bypassed the BDD.
Finally, we investigate the false positives (FPs) and missed detections (MDs) of the
proposed detectors in the presence of sensor measurement noises. Simulation results
illustrate that although the GAD yields low FP and MD rates during most of the simu-
lation time, it gives a relatively high FP rates for a few short time durations when one
or more trains change their status of motion (e.g., from tractioning mode to braking
mode). To maintain a low FP rate all the time, we propose an adaptation mechanism
based on an attack detection window for the GAD. We call the improved attack detec-
tion system GAD-W. Simulation results show that with appropriately chosen detector
parameters, the GAD-W detector achieves an average FP rate of 9 × 10−4 and an MD
rate of 7× 10−4 over the entire simulation time.
This work focuses on attacks against urban metros (e.g., Tokyo, Singapore, and
Berlin) that adopt dc systems. Thus, our analysis is based on the dc TPS model. On
the other hand, long-distance railways usually adopt an alternating current (ac) TPS,
due to higher efficiency in transmitting ac power over long distances [Rai 2016; Yadav
2013]. Although a detailed investigation of cybersecurity issues in ac traction power
systems is beyond the scope of our paper, we conjecture that the vulnerabilities of the
two systems are similar. This is because ac and dc TPSes mainly differ in their design
of electrical components (e.g., substation and train motor) [Yadav 2013], while the ICT
infrastructures in these two kinds of systems are similar. Thus, the attack surfaces of
the cyber infrastructures in both cases are the same. Nevertheless, the attack impact
analysis and the detector design may differ in details, which are left for future work.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related work.
Section 3 describes our TPS model. Section 4 formulates the efficiency and safety at-
tacks. Section 5 analyzes the effectiveness of the BDD and presents the proposed SAD
algorithm that complements the BDD. Section 6 analyzes the impact of sensor mea-
surement noises. Section 7 presents simulation results. Section 8 concludes.
2. RELATED WORK
Power flow analysis and optimization for TPS have received increasing research in-
terest. Power flow analysis is a basic tool for TPS planning and operation. Prior work
has analyzed dc power flows [Cai et al. 1995; Arboleya et al. 2016; Pires et al. 2007]
and addressed the interactions between the dc TPS and a supporting ac power grid
[Abrahamsson 2012], [Arboleya et al. 2012]. We adopt existing electrical models for
different TPS components [Cai et al. 1995], [Arboleya et al. 2016], [Pires et al. 2007] in
this work. These models provide sufficient accuracy generally [Arboleya et al. 2016],
and they are tractable for analysis. Based on power flow analysis, recent research
has tried to improve the energy efficiency of railways by leveraging trains’ power re-
generation [David 2015]. Techniques such as synchronizing the trains’ speed profiles
[Miyatake and Ko 2010; Shuai et al. 2014; Shuai et al. 2015] and real-time substation
voltage control [Raghunathan et al. 2014] have been shown to provide efficient reuse
of the regenerated power. To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing studies on
TPS control have addressed it from a cybersecurity perspective. The security problem
is imperative, since TPS is a form of critical infrastructure that renders it an attractive
target for attacks.
Different types of CPS can have vastly different properties and characteristics, and
their security concerns and admissible detection and mitigation strategies can be to-
tally different. Typically, their cybersecurity analysis must be carried out in a domain
specific manner, with customized considerations given to main details and semantics
of specific systems. Ca´rdenas et al. [Ca´rdenas et al. 2011] investigate the impacts of
integrity and denial-of-service attacks on the process control system, which has mul-
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tiple sensors and control loops, of a chemical reactor. Amin et al. [Amin et al. 2013]
perform security threat assessment of supervisory control and data acquisition sys-
tems for water supply. Other efforts [Liu et al. 2009; Jinsub and Lang 2013] have
analyzed FDI attacks against ac utility power grids. They show that an attacker capa-
ble of tampering with grid sensor measurements or topology information can carefully
construct attacks to bypass detection by certain existing fault data detectors. Recent
studies have investigated the impact of such stealthy attacks on grid power flows [Yan-
ling et al. 2011; Teixeira et al. 2012; Rahman et al. 2014]. They show that maliciously
biased estimates of the system state can cause grid operators to make erroneous de-
cisions that will lead to degraded performance or safety breaches. This paper is the
first to analyze the efficiency and safety of TPS under FDI attacks. We provide new
and non-trivial domain-specific modeling and analysis to capture the targeted appli-
cation’s unique features and key properties. In particular, TPS involves real-time and
complex interactions between two highly dynamical physical systems, namely a me-
chanical system of the trains’ motion and an electrical system that governs the trains’
power consumption and regeneration during this motion. Attackers could exploit the
interactions to strengthen their attacks.
3. TRACTION POWER SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present a model of a dc TPS at a certain time instant. The TPS is
modeled as a power network consisting of N nodes. Denote by N = {1, 2, . . . , N} the
set of nodes and L the set of resistive branches connecting the nodes. The substations
and the trains are connected to different nodes. The sets of nodes for the substations,
the tractioning trains, and the regenerating trains are denoted by Nsub, Ntra, and Nreg,
respectively. We define Ntrains = Ntra ∪ Nreg. The positions of the nodes 1, . . . , N are
denoted by a set s = {s1, s2, . . . , sN}, where s1 is fixed at zero and si is the distance
from node i to node 1. Fig. 1 illustrates a TPS section with two substations at nodes
1 and 4, as well as two trains at nodes 2 and 3. In this example, the train at node 2
is tractioning and the train at node 3 is braking and regenerating. Therefore, N =
{1, 2, 3, 4},L = {(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4)},Nsub = {1, 4},Ntra = {2},Nreg = {3}. The electrical
models for the power network, substations, and trains are described as follows.
Fig. 1: Illustration of a TPS section.
P di
Pi
V mini V
min,Tr
i Vi
(a)
Pi
P ci
V
max,Tr
i
V maxi Vi
(b)
Fig. 2: (a) Overcurrent control. (b) Squeeze con-
trol.
Power network: Let Vi and Ii denote the voltage and current at node i, respectively,
and v and i the vectors of the nodal voltages and currents. For safe operations, all
nodal voltages must be within a safety limit, i.e.,
V mini ≤ Vi ≤ V maxi , ∀i ∈ N , (1)
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where V mini and V maxi are the safety thresholds for node i. By convention, we assume
that the current injected into the TPS is positive. The resistance of the branch con-
necting the nodes i and j is denoted by Ri,j(s) and its conductance by Gi,j(s), where
Gi,j(s) = 1/Ri,j(s). Note that branch resistance (and conductance) depends on the po-
sitions of the trains, i.e., s. For instance, in Fig. 1, Ri,i+1 = γ(si+1 − si), where γ is
a constant depending on the electrical wire characteristics. From Kirchhoff ’s circuit
laws, we have
Y(s)v = i, (2)
where Y(s) ∈ RN×N is the nodal conductance matrix and the (i, j)th element of Y(s),
denoted by Yi,j(s), is given by
Yi,i(s) =
∑
j:(i,j)∈L
Gi,j(s), Yi,j(s) =
{−Gi,j(s), if j 6= i and (i, j) ∈ L,
0, if j 6= i and (i, j) /∈ L.
Substations: We consider inverting substations capable of both supplying and absorb-
ing power. They are modeled as DC voltage sources governed by
Vi = VNL −RsIi, i ∈ Nsub, (3)
where VNL and Rs are the no-load voltage and the internal resistance of the substation.
When a substation supplies power, Ii > 0; when it absorbs power, Ii < 0 and the
absorbed power is injected back to the supporting ac power grid. This dc substation
model has been widely adopted in TPS analysis [Arboleya et al. 2016], [Raghunathan
et al. 2014].
Trains: Let Pi denote the power absorbed or injected by a tractioning train or a regen-
erating train at node i. We have
Pi = ViIi. (4)
For safety, the trains adopt the following two local power controls [Okada et al. 2004].
Overcurrent control: A tractioning train absorbs power from the power network, re-
sulting in a drop in the train’s nodal voltage. To prevent the nodal voltage from falling
below the safety threshold V mini , the overcurrent control is activated whenever the
nodal voltage at the train node i drops below a triggering voltage V min,Tri . Let P
d
i de-
note the power demand of a tractioning train at node i. The overcurrent control will
command the train to absorb Pi units of power, where Pi is given by
Pi =

0, if Vi ≤ V mini ;
P di
(
Vi−V mini
V min,Tri −V mini
)
, if V mini ≤ Vi ≤ V min,Tri ;
P di , if Vi ≥ V min,Tri .
(5)
This control law is illustrated in Fig. 2 (a). Specifically, if the nodal voltage at the train
is greater than the triggering voltage, the train draws a power equal to its demand.
Otherwise, the train curtails its power consumption according to the Vi. If the voltage
drops below V mini , the train does not draw power to prevent safety incidents.
Squeeze control: A regenerating train injects power into the power network, resulting
in an increase in the train’s nodal voltage. To prevent the voltage from exceeding the
safety limit V maxi , the squeeze control is activated whenever the nodal voltage at the
train node i exceeds a certain triggering voltage level V Tri,max. Let P ci denote the regen-
eration capacity of the train. The squeeze control will command the train to inject Pi
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units of power into the TPS, where Pi is given by
Pi =

P ci , if Vi ≤ V max,Tri ;
P ci
(
V maxi −Vi
V maxi −V max,Tri
)
, if V max,Tri ≤ Vi ≤ V maxi ;
0, if Vi ≥ V maxi .
(6)
This control law is illustrated in Fig. 2 (b). Specifically, if the nodal voltage at the
train is lower than the triggering voltage, the train injects all the regenerated power.
Otherwise, the train curtails the power injection according to the Vi by burning the re-
maining power in a rheostatic braking system [Okada et al. 2004]. If the voltage drops
below V maxi , the train does not inject power into the TPS to prevent safety incidents.
The train’s power demand P di and regeneration capacity P ci depend on the train’s
running profile and real-time state. They can be provided by the train’s motion con-
trol system. We note that the electrical models described in this section address the
steady-state voltages and currents. They ignore the power transients of the trains
due to their internal feedback control systems that implement the overcurrent/squeeze
control decisions. However, it is safe to ignore these transients because they can settle
quickly, before the next overcurrent/squeeze control action [Talukdar and Koo 1977].
This steady-state analysis approach has been widely adopted in TPS power flow anal-
ysis [Cai et al. 1995; Pires et al. 2007; Arboleya et al. 2016].
4. FALSE DATA INJECTION ATTACKS AGAINST TPS
In this section, we study how an attacker can mislead the TPS into an inefficient or
unsafe operating state. We focus on FDI attacks that tamper with the measurements
of train-borne voltage and current sensors. Such an attack will cause the TPS to make
wrong decisions of power absorption/injection, since a train’s overcurrent and squeeze
controls depend on the sensor measurements. We further consider attacks of two dif-
ferent objectives: (i) increase the system’s total instantaneous power consumption, and
(ii) cause breaches of the safety conditions in (1). We call these two types of attacks effi-
ciency attack and safety attack, respectively. In this section, we first describe our threat
model. Then, we analyze the attacker’s approach of computing effective efficiency and
safety attacks. Lastly, we present numerical results to illustrate the two kinds of at-
tacks.
4.1. Threat Model
Real-world attackers against critical CPSes are often smart, resourceful, and highly
strategic. Their strategies can be guided by detailed knowledge of their targets, which
can be obtained in practice by malicious insiders, long-term data exfiltration [Syman-
tec 2014], or social engineering against employees, contractors, or vendors of the op-
erators in question [Karnouskos 2011]. In this paper, we follow Kerckhoffs’s principle
to consider an attacker who has accurate knowledge of the targeted system and read
access to the system state. Knowledge of the system includes the electrical models and
parameters given in Section 3, as well as the system’s method of attack detection. The
system state includes present power demands, regeneration capacities, and voltage,
current, and position measurements of all the trains. This information can be leaked
through a compromised operation center, as in recent high-profile attacks [Karnouskos
2011; Symantec 2014]. We assume that the attacker has write access to voltage, cur-
rent, and position measurements of nodes in the set Na, where Na ⊆ N , so that he can
corrupt these measurements. Recent studies have demonstrated that such unautho-
rized write access can be obtained for analog sensors, traditional electro-mechanical
meters, and modern smart meters [McDaniel and McLaughlin 2009; Depuru et al.
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2011; Kune et al. 2013]. Analog sensors are vulnerable to precisely controlled elec-
tromagnetic interference [Kune et al. 2013]; measurement devices can be affected
by hardware trojans [Karri et al. 2010] and infected with malwares [McDaniel and
McLaughlin 2009; Mike 2009].
Under the said Kerckhoffs’s assumption on the attacker’s knowledge, we will analyze
his strategies of achieving successful efficiency and safety attacks. Conversely, we will
also develop countermeasures by a defender to detect these attacks and mitigate their
impacts. Our threat model is strong, but the conservative analysis is necessary because
any underestimation of the attacker’s capability may have catastrophic consequences,
including extremely costly infrastructure damage and loss of human lives.
We note that, alternatively, the attacker can launch FDI attacks against the deci-
sions of the local controls (i.e., the Pi values for the trains). To detect such attacks,
each train can compare the Pi value in question with that computed based on the
train’s voltage and current measurements and the a priori overcurrent and squeeze
control laws. In the rest of this paper, we focus on the analysis and detection of FDI
attacks on the voltage and current measurements only. This problem is comparatively
much more challenging since information compromised right at the sources will pre-
clude its use for any subsequent sanity checks.
Finally, we note that other potential attacks such as the denial-of-service (DoS) at-
tacks that block sensor reading reporting can be easily detected, since in TPSes, sen-
sors periodically report readings. Upon detection, the operator can initiate mitigation
steps (e.g., stop the trains) to prevent any safety incidents. Thus, in this paper, we
focus on the more challenging FDI attacks, as its detection generally needs a deep
understanding on the power flows and train/substation operations.
4.2. FDI Attack Construction
In this section, we analyze how to compute an effective attack vector, as a vector of
false voltage and current measurements to be injected into the sensing systems of the
trains in Na. Note that, in this section we ignore position measurements in the attack
vector, because they will not affect the trains’ overcurrent and squeeze controls. In the
rest of the paper, we will use x′ to denote the compromised version of a sensor mea-
surement x. In the following analysis, we first derive conditions for the attack vector
to mislead the train into absorbing or injecting a certain amount of power. With the
calculated power absorptions/injections of the trains, we can determine the system’s
total power consumption and hence its safety status. Thus, we can formulate the at-
tacker’s problem of finding an attack vector to achieve his goal of maximizing the total
power consumption, under conditions that we will state presently for enforcing certain
amounts of power absorption/injection.
The following conditions are sufficient to enforce that a train at node i ∈ Na will
absorb or inject Pi units of power:
V ′i

≥ V min,Tri , if Pi = P di ,
= V mini +
Pi(V
min,Tr
i −V mini )
Pmini
, if P di ≤ Pi ≤ 0,
≤ V mini , if Pi = 0,
∀i ∈ Na ∩Ntra; (7)
V ′i

≥ V maxi , if Pi = 0,
= V maxi − Pi(V
max
i −V max,Tri )
P ci
, if 0 ≤ Pi ≤ P ci ,
≤ V max,Tri , if Pi = P ci ,
∀i ∈ Na ∩Nreg; (8)
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V ′i I
′
i = Pi, i ∈ Na; (9)
Pi ≥ P di , i ∈ Ntra; (10)
Pi ≤ P ci , i ∈ Nreg. (11)
The conditions in (7) and (8) are obtained by inverting the overcurrent and squeeze
control laws given in Section 3, and replacing the true voltage Vi by the compromised
measurement V ′i . As a result, based on V ′i , the train will follow the overcurrent/squeeze
control law to regulate its power absorption/injection to the attacker’s desired value Pi.
This control process is often achieved in a closed loop, with the measurements V ′i and I ′i
acting as feedback and the desired value Pi as setpoint. Under the condition (9), the ac-
tual power absorption/injection under the aforementioned closed-loop control will con-
verge to Pi. Moreover, the condition (9) can hide the attack for trains that can directly
measure the power consumption. The conditions (10) and (11) ensure the feasibility
of inducing the train to absorb/inject Pi units of power. Specifically, the attacker’s de-
sired Pi should not exceed a regenerating train’s regeneration capacity. The condition
(10), where both Pi and P di are negative, prevents the mechanism from violating the
overcurrent control. In summary, if the compromised measurements V ′i and I ′i satisfy
the conditions in (7) to (11), the train will control its power absorption/injection to Pi.
With this understanding, the attacker can carefully plan the attack vector to achieve
his goal. Without the conditions in (7) to (11), the attacker cannot predict the impact
of his attack and therefore cannot implement his desired strategy.
Each sensor in the TPS may apply data quality checks on its measurements. For
instance, the measurements at the present time instant should not differ significantly
from those predicted based on the measurements at the previous time instant. Intu-
itively, if the compromised measurement is bounded around the true measurement, the
data quality checks, designed to be insensitive to natural random noises of measure-
ment, will not raise an alarm. Thus, we assume that the compromised measurements
need to satisfy:
v −∆v  v′  v + ∆v, (12)
i−∆i  i′  i + ∆i, (13)
where ∆v = [∆V1, . . . ,∆VN ]T and ∆i = [∆I1, . . . ,∆IN ]T are the maximum errors al-
lowed by the data quality checks (in Section 7, we illustrate how to set the values of
∆v and ∆i based on practical considerations); x  y means that each element of x is
no greater than the corresponding element in y. We note that, if i /∈ Na, ∆Vi = 0. In
practice, the attacker can obtain the settings of ∆v and ∆i by launching a data exfil-
tration attack [Symantec 2014]. In the absence of such knowledge, the attacker must
choose stringent values for these quantities such that the attack is not detected by the
data-quality checks.
Based on the above conditions for the compromised measurements, we now formu-
late the efficiency and safety attacks.
4.2.1. Efficiency Attack. An efficiency attack causes an increase or decrease in the total
instantaneous power injected or absorbed by the substations. In particular, we consider
an aggressive attacker who aims to maximize or minimize such injected or absorbed
power. Formally, the attacker solves the following constrained optimization problem to
compute the attack vector {V ′i , I ′i|∀i ∈ Na}:
max
{V ′i ,I′i| ∀i∈Na}
∑
i∈Nsub
ViIi (14)
s.t. constraints in (2) to (13).
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The above formulation captures the physical laws governing the power network and
the substations (i.e., (2) to (4)), as well as how the attack vector induces the trains
to make erroneous power control decisions (i.e., (7) to (11)). Specifically, for any
{V ′i , I ′i |∀i ∈ Na} satisfying (7) to (11), the attacker can predict the trains’ power
absorptions/injections {Pi = V ′i I ′i |∀i ∈ Ntrains}. He then uses the physical laws in
(2), (3), and (4) to determine the actual voltages and currents of the substations (i.e.,
{Vi, Ii |∀i ∈ Nsub}) and predict the system’s total power consumption
∑
i∈Nsub ViIi.
Solving the constrained optimization problem in (14) can be computationally ex-
pensive, mainly because the constraints in (7) and (8) are non-smooth and non-
differentiable. Existing constrained non-linear optimization solvers (e.g., the fmincon
function of MATLAB) often require the objective and constraint functions to be smooth.
To use these existing solvers, the attacker can adopt a divide-and-conquer approach
that splits the problem (14) into multiple subproblems in which a piece of (7) or (8)
is selected as a constraint for a train. By comparing the optimization results of all
the subproblems, the attacker can obtain a global optimal solution to the problem in
(14). Because each train has three choices in (7) or (8), this approach will generate a
total of 3|Na| subproblems, where |Na| is the number of trains under FDI attacks. As
the subproblems are mutually independent, the attacker can solve the subproblems
in parallel, to reduce computation time. We note that the ability to solve the problem
in (14) in real time can be important to the attacker. This is because, to accumulate
large energy loss, the attacker needs to keep at the FDI attacks by solving (14) con-
tinually, based on the latest system state given by s, P di , and P ci . The attacker will
need to procure sufficient computing resources for achieving the real-time objective. A
resource-constrained attacker can inject a suboptimal attack that does not require ex-
tensive computations like solving (14). In Section 4.3, we present a numerical example
to show that such an attack can still cause a considerable performance degradation.
4.2.2. Safety Attack. For safety attacks, we model the space of attack vectors that can
cause the voltages at a subset of the TPS nodes, denoted by Nunsafe, to cross the safety
limits in (1). The attack space is defined by all the constraint conditions in the opti-
mization problem (14), and Vi /∈ [Vi,min, Vi,max], i ∈ Nunsafe. As long as the attacker can
find an attack vector satisfying the above constraints, he will be able to achieve the
safety breaches.
We now discuss a heuristic approach that the attacker can use to aggressively in-
crease the extent of the safety breaches. Specifically, the attacker maximizes the total
power injected into the TPS by the regenerating trains, i.e.,
∑
i∈Nreg ViIi, subject to all
the constraints of the optimization problem in (14). The intuition is that injecting more
power into the TPS will result in higher catenary voltages. This constrained optimiza-
tion problem can also be solved by the aforementioned divide-and-conquer approach.
The TPS under FDI attacks can be analyzed using the same set of equations as in
Section 3 (i.e., (1)-(6)), except that the train’s overcurrent and squeeze control deci-
sions are now computed based on the attacker’s injections V ′i (in (5) and (6)). Based on
this analysis, in Section 4.3 we present numerical example to show the impact of effi-
ciency and safety attacks. We also present time-domain simulation results in Section 7
considering realistic running profiles of trains.
4.3. Numerical Examples
We now present numerical examples to illustrate the efficiency and safety attacks.
These examples are based on the TPS shown in Fig. 1, in which both trains are de-
celerating and regenerating. The system model parameters are given in Table IV. We
consider a time instant at which the system state in the absence of attack is given by
the first part of Table II, where the total instantaneous power absorbed by the sub-
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Parameters VNL γ Rs Vmax,Tri V
max
i
Value 750V 30mΩ/km 29.56mΩ 850V 900V
Table I: TPS model parameters.
stations and injected back into the supporting ac power grid is 3.601 MW. In these
examples, we assume that the attacker can only compromise the voltage and current
measurements of the train at node 2.
4.3.1. Efficiency Attack. The attacker solves the constrained optimization problem in
(14) and tampers with V2 and I2 accordingly. We set ∆Vi = 50V and ∆Ii = 200A,
∀i ∈ Na. The compromised measurements and the true state of the system under at-
tack are given in the second part of Table II. We can see that the compromised voltage
measurement at node 2 is greater than the true value. Consequently, the train injects
less power into the TPS because of the squeeze control, resulting in less power ab-
sorption by the substations. Specifically, the total power absorption is 2.888 MW, a 20%
reduction compared with the case of no attack. Thus, the power efficiency of the system
is degraded.
We also consider a suboptimal attack in which the attacker compromises the voltage
of the train at node 2 by 20 V (hence V ′i = Vi + 20V ). Under this attack, the total
power absorption is 3.25 MW, a 9.5%, reduction compared with the case of no attack.
This shows that the attacker can still cause a considerable degradation in the system
efficiency by injecting a suboptimal attack. In practice, the attacker can tune his attack
strategy to balance between the attack impact and the computational complexity of
computing the attacks.
4.3.2. Safety Attack. The attacker uses the heuristic approach in Section 4.2.2 to com-
pute the safety attack. The compromised measurements and the true system state are
given in the third part of Table II. The compromised voltage measurement at node 2
is lower than its true value. Thus, the train at node 2 injects more power into the TPS
because of the squeeze control, causing the actual voltage at node 2 to exceed the safety
limit. We can see that it is possible for an attacker to tamper with the measurements
of a single train and already achieve a safety attack. In this example, since both the
trains are regenerating, the catenary voltages are closer to the safety limit. This makes
it easier for the attacker to achieve the safety attack. Thus, for an attacker with lim-
ited write access to the trains’ measurements (i.e., a small setNa), he can continuously
monitor the system and wait for feasible moments for launching safety attacks.
5. GLOBAL ATTACK DETECTION
As discussed in Section 1, dc TPSes mainly rely on trains’ local controls (i.e., over-
current and squeeze controls) to avoid unsafe states. The TPS does not otherwise
cross-check sensor data from different trains to ensure the data’s global consistency.
However, such global monitoring is clearly advantageous, because anomalies in the
data relationships can help flag the occurrence of an FDI attack. Furthermore, not
only can we cross-check sensor measurements from different trains, we can also check
these measurements against an a priori global TPS model to ensure agreement. An
attacker that wishes to remain stealthy under global monitoring thus becomes more
constrained, and his actions may become less effective. In this section, we present the
design of a global monitor for detecting FDI attacks under the Kerckhoffs’s assump-
tion, which we will subsequently refer to as the global attack detector (GAD).
Fig. 3 overviews our global attack detection approach. In the approach, the trains’
voltage, current, and position measurements are sent to a central TPS monitor peri-
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Node 1 2 3 4 EfficiencyLoss
TPS State
(Without Attack)
si 0 0.9 1.2 2
P ci - 5.5 1.8 -
Vi 815.6 875.5 867.7 815 —
Ii -2218.8 3079.2 1338 -2198.4
Pi -1.81 2.696 1.161 -1.792
Efficiency Attack
(Optimal)
V ′i - 888.6 - -
I ′i - 1409.6 - -
Vi 801.1 847.7 850 805.2 20 %
Ii -1728.2 1477.6 2117.6 -1867.1
Pi -1.384 1.253 1.8 -1.503
Efficiency Attack
(Suboptimal)
V ′i - 881.9 - -
I ′i - 1409.6 - -
Vi 808.5 861.9 859.1 810.1 9.5 %
Ii -1979.2 2301.1 1715 -2036.5
Pi -1.606 1.98 1.47 -1.65
Safety Attack
V ′i - 862.9 - -
I ′i - 4731.6 - -
Vi 828.9 901 884.2 824.1 —
Ii -2669.1 4531.6 643.2 -2505.7
Pi -2.212 4.083 0.569 -2.065
Table II: System state and compromised measurements under efficiency and safety
attacks. Distance is measured in kilometers, voltage in volts, current in amperes, and
power in megawatts.
SE 
Central TPS monitor 
BDD 
Attack 
mitigation 
Fail Fail 
Pass Pass 
PIV 
Continue 
operation 
Compromised 
measurements 
Communication 
network 
SAD 
Pass 
Fail 
Fig. 3: Global attack detection. SE: State estimation; BDD: Bad data detection; PIV:
Position integrity verification; SAD: Secondary attack detection.
odically. As Fig. 3 illustrates, the TPS monitor applies state estimation (SE), bad data
detection (BDD), position integrity verification (PIV), and secondary attack detection
(SAD) in sequence to detect attacks. In ac utility power grids, similar SE and related
BDD are widely used for detecting faulty data or reducing the impact of noisy sensor
measurements [Wood and Wollenberg 1996]. In Section 5.1, we propose a new BDD
design that is specific to the application domain of dc TPS. By checking the consis-
tency among measurements based on prior knowledge of the TPS, the BDD can detect
a range of FDI attacks. However, the detection is not complete – an attacker under the
ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1, Publication date: January 2017.
Modeling and Detecting False Data Injection Attacks against Railway Traction Power Systems 1:13
Kerckhoffs’s assumption will be able to bypass it using his knowledge of the system.
In Section 7, we provide numerical results to illustrate the impacts of these stealthy
efficiency and safety attacks. To counter the stealthy attacks, in Section 5.3 we further
propose a novel SAD algorithm to supplement the BDD, under an additional assump-
tion that the trains’ position data is intact, which is ensured by the PIV.
5.1. TPS Bad Data Detection and Its Vulnerability
Recall that in Section 4.2, the trains apply local controls based on their own voltage
and current measurements only. Hence, the trains’ position information does not mat-
ter. Under global detection, however, compromise of the trains’ position information
becomes relevant, since it may enable the attacker to mislead the TPS monitor into
deriving an incorrect TPS model that is consistent with the compromised voltage and
current measurements. Tampering with the position data can thus help the attacker
evade detection. Although in practice it is extremely difficult for the attacker to hide
the compromise of train position data because multiple sources of this data are often
available (see Section 5.3 for the details), in this section, for generality, we account for
possible compromise of the position data.
We use x˜ to represent a possibly compromised measurement x, i.e., x˜ = x in the
absence of attack and x˜ = x′ in the presence of attack. The state of the TPS is the
vector of the nodal voltages, i.e., v. The set of measurements includes nodal positions
s˜ = [s˜1, . . . , s˜N ]
T ∈ RN×1, and nodal voltage and current readings z˜ = [v˜, i˜]T ∈ R2N×1.
In the absence of attack, the measurement vector z is related to the system state v
as z = H(s)v + n, where H(s) = [IN ; Y(s)] is a measurement matrix depending on
the positions s, IN is an N -dimensional identity matrix, and n ∈ R2N×1 is a random
measurement noise vector. We assume that n follows a multivariate Gaussian distri-
bution. The maximum likelihood (ML) estimate of v, denoted by vˆ, is given by [Wood
and Wollenberg 1996, Chap. 12]
vˆ = (H(s˜)TΣ−1H(s˜))−1H(s˜)TΣ−1z˜,
where Σ is the covariance matrix of n. The SE’s BDD raises an alarm if
(z˜−H(s˜)vˆ)TΣ−1(z˜−H(s˜)vˆ) > τ,
where τ is a constant threshold that can be determined to meet a given false alarm rate
under random measurement noise3. The BDD is originally designed to detect faulty
sensor data caused by natural malfunction of sensors. Thus, it is effective in detecting
a range of FDI attacks that are not specifically designed to bypass it. However, the
attacker that we consider in this paper, following the Kerckhoffs’s principle, will be
able to design FDI attacks with the objective of bypassing the BDD. In the following,
we formulate these stealthy safety and efficiency attacks.
From an existing result [Liu et al. 2009], if the compromised measurement vector z′
is in the column space of the compromised measurement matrix H(s′), z′ can bypass
the BDD. Applying this result to the TPS, we have the following lemma.
LEMMA 5.1. Any compromised measurements that satisfy
Y(s′)v′ = i′ (15)
can bypass the BDD.
PROOF. Lemma 5.1 holds since any compromised measurement vector z′ that satis-
fies (15) lies in the column space of H(s′), i.e., z′ = [v′, i′]T = [IN ; Y(s′)]v′ = H(s′)v′.
3A detailed description of how to set the BDD threshold is given in Appendix A.
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In addition to (15), the TPS monitor may use two other sensor data checks. First,
to meet the constraint in (15), the attacker may need to compromise the voltage and
current measurements at the substations. The TPS monitor may check the substation
measurements, i.e., Vi and Ii, ∀i ∈ Nsub, against the substation model in (3). To be
stealthy to this check, the attacker can impose an additional constraint of
V ′i = VNL −RsI ′i, ∀i ∈ Nsub. (16)
Second, the TPS monitor can also apply data quality checks similar to those in (12) and
(13) to check the trains’ position measurements. Thus, if the attacker can compromise
the position measurements, he needs to satisfy
s−∆s  s′  s + ∆s, (17)
where ∆s = [∆s1, . . . ,∆sN ]T are the maximum allowed errors for position measure-
ments and ∆si = 0 if i /∈ Na.
Therefore, the efficiency attacks that are stealthy to the BDD can be computed by
solving the constrained optimization problem (14) with the additional constraints (15),
(16), and (17). Similarly, the attack space for BDD-stealthy safety attacks is character-
ized by the constraints of the optimization problem (14), Vi /∈ [Vi,min, Vi,max], i ∈ Nunsafe,
and the additional constraints (15), (16), and (17). Naturally, BDD reduces the attack
space since the attacker now needs to satisfy additional constraints to remain unde-
tected. In the simulation results presented in Section 7, we show that, under a realistic
TPS setting, the BDD significantly reduces the impact of attacks.
5.2. Numerical Examples
We now present numerical examples to illustrate the efficiency and safety attacks that
can bypass the BDD as analyzed in Section 5.1. The TPS model and parameters are
identical to those in Section 4.3. The true system state and the compromised measure-
ments are given in Table III. We set ∆si = 0.6 km, ∀i ∈ Na. To illustrate a powerful
attacker, we assume that the attacker can corrupt the voltage and current measure-
ments of all the four nodes in Fig. 1, as well as the positions of both the trains.
5.2.1. Efficiency Attack. Under the efficiency attack, the total power injected back to the
supporting power grid by the substations is 3.431 MW, which is a reduction of about
4.7% compared with no attacks. This reduction is much less than the 20% caused by the
efficiency attack in Section 4.3, which was achieved by compromising the voltage and
current measurements of node 2 only in the absence of BDD. This result illustrates the
ability of the BDD in limiting the impact of efficiency attacks.
5.2.2. Safety Attack. We observe that by compromising the nodal measurements and
the trains’ position information, the attacker can increase the voltage at node 2 to
901.4 V while bypassing the BDD. Furthermore, if the attacker can gain write access
to any one train (i.e., |Na| = 1), he cannot launch a successful safety attack. This is in
contrast to the example in Section 4.3, where the attacker could launch a successful
safety attack by compromising the measurements of a single train only.
In summary, the above examples suggest that the global monitoring and BDD can
significantly limit the impact of stealthy FDI attacks on the TPS even if the attacker
can compromise the measurements of multiple trains. To accomplish a safety attack,
the attacker needs to compromise more trains compared with no BDD.
5.3. Secondary Attack Detection (SAD)
In this section, we propose a novel secondary attack detection (SAD) algorithm that
can effectively detect the onset of an FDI attack that has bypassed the BDD. A require-
ment for the SAD is that the trains’ position data communicated to the TPS monitor is
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Node 1 2 3 4
Efficiency Attack
s′i 0 1 1 2
V ′i 812 874.9 874.9 812
I ′i -2096.7 3159 1034.5 -2096.8
Vi 813.2 871 861.7 811.6
Ii -2138.8 3173.2 1050.4 -2084.8
Pi -1.739 2.764 0.905 -1.692
Safety Attack
s′i 0 0.43 1.8 2
V ′i 835 872.3 847.3 830.9
I ′i -2876.8 3487.8 2124.5 -2735.4
Vi 829.1 901.4 895.1 830.1
Ii -2676.8 3375.3 2010.9 -2709.4
Pi -2.219 3.043 1.8 -2.249
Table III: System state and compromised measurements under efficiency and safety
attacks that have bypassed the BDD. Distance is measured in kilometers, voltage in
volts, current in amperes, power in megawatts.
intact. It is feasible for the TPS monitor to verify the integrity of the position data. For
example, real-world railway systems invariably provide multiple sources of train posi-
tion information including train-borne wheel sensors and GPS, track-side Balise [Al-
stom 2001], etc. By cross-checking position measurements from the multiple sources,
we can readily identify FDI attacks on the position data unless the attacker succeeds
in compromising all the data sources, which is highly challenging since these sensors
use technologies that are significantly different from each other. For example, GPS is
a satellite-based system, Balise uses electronic beacon or transponder placed between
the rails, etc. Such cross checks constitute the PIV illustrated in Fig. 3. Given that TPS
is a safety-critical system, the operator should enforce the highest consistency require-
ment on the position measurements from different sensors, i.e., if any inconsistency is
found among different position sensors’ readings, the PIV should raise a fault/attack
alarm. If FDI attacks on the position data are identified, the TPS should immediately
apply attack mitigation such as the approach discussed in Section 5.4.
Note that the analysis in the previous sections is for a particular time instant, and
the attacker can use the techniques in Sections 4 and 5.1 to launch attacks continually
over time. Once the SAD detects an attack’s onset, the system can activate the attack
mitigation approach in Section 5.4 to render subsequent FDIs ineffective. Thus, in
this section we focus on analyzing the property of the system and designing the SAD
accordingly for the onset time instant only of an attack.
5.3.1. A Discrete Solution Property. The requirement of intact position data and the de-
sign of the SAD algorithm are based on a key observation as follows. If the attacker can
compromise the trains’ position data, the three equality conditions (9), (15), and (16)
that the attacker must obey form an underdetermined problem with 3N variables and
2N equations. Since the other conditions that the attacker needs to follow (i.e., (7), (8),
(10) to (13), and (17)) are inequalities, the attacker’s problem of finding stealthy FDI
attack vectors most likely has infinitely many solutions that are continuous. However,
if the trains’ position data is intact, the three equality conditions (9), (15), and (16)
with s′ replaced by the known s, will form a determined problem with 2N variables
and 2N equations. As a result, the attacker’s problem has a finite number of discrete
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solutions (which we will prove shortly) and the attacker must choose one of them that
is different from the true measurement vector. In what follows, we first show that with
intact position data, there are only a finite number of discrete solutions that satisfy
the BDD-passing conditions. We then describe the SAD algorithm.
The BDD bypass conditions given by (15) and (16) can be compactly represented as
V (Y(s) + G) v = c, (18)
where the (i, j)th elements of the matrices V ∈ RN×N and G ∈ RN×N are given by
V(i, j) =
{
Vi, if i = j and i ∈ Ntrains,
1, otherwise,
, G(i, j) =
{
R−1s , if i = j and i ∈ Nsub,
0, otherwise,
,
and the ith element of the vector c ∈ RN×1 is given by
c(i) =
{
P (i), if i ∈ Ntrains,
VNL
Rs
, if i ∈ Nsub.
Equation (18) is a system consisting of N polynomial equations with N variables. Such
a system of equations is referred to as a square polynomial system, and the Bezout’s
theorem provides an upper bound on the number of solutions for such systems. The
Bezout’s theorem is as follows.
THEOREM 5.2. (Bezout’s Theorem) [Sottile 2011] For a square polynomial system,
the bound on the number of complex solutions is at most the product of the degrees of
the polynomials.
The existence of the upper bound proves that the system of polynomials in (18) has
a finite number of discrete solutions. For the BDD bypass condition in (18), we have
a polynomial constraint corresponding to each train in the system (Ntra ∪ Nreg), and
each one is a second degree polynomial. Thus, the upper bound according to Bezout’s
theorem would be 2|Ntra∪Nreg|. However, in practice, we found that several solutions to
the square polynomial system were complex, which we can discard (since the voltages
in a dc system cannot be complex).
We now provide a numerical example to illustrate this property. In this example,
we use the TPS shown in Fig. 1 with the settings listed in Table IV and P2 = P3 =
−0.3 MW. The two curves in Fig. 4 correspond to the two equality conditions that V ′2
and V ′3 need to satisfy to bypass the BDD. Their intersections are the solutions to the
attacker’s problem of finding stealthy attack vectors. We can see that the solutions are
discrete.
VNL 750 V
γ 0.03 Ω km
Rs 0.02956 Ω
Vmax,Tri 850 V
Vmaxi 900 V
Table IV: TPS parameters.
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(88.3 V, 13.6 V)
(23.8 V, 21.7 V)
(13.6 V, 95.3 V)
Fig. 4: A numerical example illustrating discrete solu-
tion property.
5.3.2. SAD Algorithm. Based on the discrete solution property, we design the SAD al-
gorithm as follows.
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Inputs: Trains’ true positions s, possibly compromised measurement vector z˜, intact nodal
voltage vector vpr at the previous time instant
Output: Attack onset detection result
1. Using z˜, compute Pi = V˜iI˜i, i ∈ Ntrains.
2. Solve the following constrained optimization problem
J∗ = min
va,vb
va 6=vb
||va − vb||p (19a)
s.t. Va (Y(s) +G)va = c, (19b)
Vb (Y(s) +G)vb = c, (19c)
where ||x||p represents the p-norm of a vector x
3. Extract v˜ from z˜. If ||v˜ − vpr||p ≤ J∗, report no attack; Otherwise, report onset of attack.
4. If there only exists two discrete points in the solution set, J∗ = αJ∗
In Step 1 of the algorithm, given the possibly compromised measurement vector z˜,
the TPS monitor computes the actual power absorption or injection of each train. We
note that this follows from (4). Based on the trains’ true positions s and powers, in
Step 2, the TPS monitor solves the constrained optimization problem (19). The con-
straints in (19b) and (19c) are compact representations of the BDD bypass condition
as explained in (18), for two distinct solutions va and vb. By the observation that the
BDD bypass condition given the trains’ true positions has discrete solutions, va and
vb that solve the optimization problem (19) are two distinct solutions that are closest
to each other (among all such pairs of solution vectors) and the J∗ given by (19) is the
minimum distance.
In Step 3, the TPS monitor compares the J∗ with the p-norm distance between the
possibly compromised voltage measurement vector and the intact nodal voltage vector
vpr at the previous time instant, to determine the possible onset of an attack. This step
is based on that if the attacker launches a BDD-stealthy attack without tampering
with the trains’ position information, the p-norm distance between the compromised
voltage vector and the voltage vector in the absence of attack must be no less than
J∗. As the voltage vector in the absence of attack is unknown to the TPS monitor, a
practical approach is to use the vpr that is not compromised before the onset of the
attack. Since the TPS monitor can run the SAD periodically and frequently (e.g., every
second), the TPS state will not change significantly over one monitoring time inter-
nal. In Section 7, extensive simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of this practical
approach by comparing it with an oracle approach that uses the voltage vector at the
present time instant in the absence of attack in Step 3. If and when the onset of an
attack is detected, the TPS switches to an attack mitigation mode, as discussed in Sec-
tion 5.4, to prevent safety breaches. In step 4, we scale the value of J∗ by a parameter
α ∈ [0, 1] in case there are only two discrete solutions that satisfy the BDD-passing
condition. Step 4 is introduced to reduce the MDs of the SAD in the presence of sensor
measurement noises (the rationale behind the introduction of this parameter will be
explained in Section 6).
5.4. Attack Mitigation
We outline an approach to mitigating the impact of an attack that has been detected
by the TPS monitor by the BDD, PIV, or SAD. On detecting the onset of the attack, the
system switches to an attack mitigation mode in which the TPS monitor issues power
absorption/injection commands to the trains to replace their local overcurrent/squeeze
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controls. Specifically, the TPS monitor computes the Pi for each train based on the
trains’ power demands, regeneration capacities, and positions by solving the electrical
models and trains’ local control laws presented in Section 3. Note that the trains can
report their power demands and regeneration capacities to the TPS monitor. The TPS
monitor can also estimate them based on trains’ running profiles that are often fixed
during the planning phase. If FDI attacks on trains’ position information have been
detected, the system can estimate the trains’ positions based on their running profiles.
Each train applies the Pi received from the TPS monitor. The core idea of this mitiga-
tion approach is to run the TPS temporarily based on models rather than compromised
sensor measurements. Emergent running profiles that stop the trains safely should be
applied immediately once the system enters the attack mitigation mode.
6. IMPACT OF SENSOR MEASUREMENT NOISE
In this section, we examine the performance of the GAD in the presence of sensor
measurement noises. In this section, we consider the additive Gaussian noise model
described in Section 5.1. Sensor measurement noise provides the attacker an opportu-
nity to hide its attack by masquerading false measurements as legitimate noisy mea-
surements, leading to MDs and FPs. MDs may result in the loss of system efficiency
or safety breaches. On the other hand, FPs result in the system operator initiating
unnecessary mitigation steps that may degrade performance. We now formally define
FPs and MDs for the BDD, SAD, and GAD respectively.
We consider two hypotheses: H0 denotes that the system is not under attack, and H1
denotes that the system is under attack. We let ZBDD and ΞBDD represent the indicator
variables for the occurrences of FP and MD, respectively, in the BDD, and ZSAD and
ΞSAD represent the corresponding quantities for the SAD. They can be mathematically
stated as
ZBDD = 1{(z˜−H(s˜)vˆ)TΣ−1(z˜−H(s˜)vˆ)>τ
∣∣H0}, ZSAD = 1{||v˜−vpr||p>J∗ ∣∣H0},
ΞBDD = 1{(z˜−H(s˜)vˆ)TΣ−1(z˜−H(s˜)vˆ)≤τ
∣∣H1}, ΞSAD = 1{||v˜−vpr||p≤J∗ ∣∣H1},
where 1A is an indicator function given by 1A = 1 if A is true, or 0 otherwise. Similarly,
we define ZGAD and ΞGAD for the GAD. Since the GAD serializes the BDD and SAD,
it will raise an alarm if one of the following two events occurs: i) the BDD raises an
alarm; or ii) if the measurements pass the BDD but the SAD raises an alarm. Thus
ZGAD can be expressed in terms of ZBDD and ZSAD as
ZGAD = ZBDD ∨ (¬ZBDD ∧ ZSAD).
Similarly, ΞGAD can be expressed in terms of ΞBDD and ΞBDD as
ΞGAD = ΞBDD ∧ ΞSAD. (20)
Next, we use a numeric example to illustrate FPs and MDs in the cases of BDD and
SAD, respectively, for a representative TPS network.
—BDD FPs and MDs: The BDD’s FPs and MDs are caused by fluctuations in the
residual value (z˜ − H(s˜)vˆ)TΣ−1(z˜ − H(s˜)vˆ), which are in turn caused by the mea-
surement noises. This is illustrated in Fig. 5 for a TPS model identical to that in Sec-
tion 5.3, considering 1000 realizations of measurement noise sampled from an i.i.d.
zero-mean Gaussian distribution with a standard deviation set to 0.3% of the full-
scale voltage [Smitt 2016] and current sensor readings, respectively. (The full-scale
voltage and current readings are 900 V and 2, 500 A, respectively.) To generate TPS
measurements under H1, we inject an additive attack of 20 V to the voltage measure-
ment of node 2. It can be seen that in the absence of measurement noise, the value
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of the residual is 0 under H0, and non-zero under H1. Therefore, any occurrence of
a non-zero residual indicates the presence of an attack in a noiseless environment.
However, in the presence of sensor measurement noise, the value of the residual
fluctuates under different noise instantiations. Thus, differentiating measurements
under attack from those under natural measurement noise becomes challenging.
—FPs and MDs of SAD under the Oracle Approach: The SAD’s FPs and MDs are
due to fluctuations in the value of J∗ and ||v − vpr|| under different realizations of
the measurement noise, as illustrated in Fig. 6, for hypothesis H0. (Recall from Algo-
rithm 1 that in this case, noisy voltage and current measurements are used as inputs
to the SAD algorithm.) Note from Fig. 6 that in the absence of measurement noise,
both these quantities have a fixed value, in contrast to the case of noisy measure-
ments. Thus, in the presence of noise, an FP is declared whenever there is no attack
on the system and ||v−vpr|| ≥ J∗, and MD is declared whenever the system is under
attack and ||v − vpr|| < J∗.
—FPs and MDs of SAD under the Practical Approach: Another factor that con-
tributes to the occurrence of FPs and MDs in the practical approach is the follow-
ing. Since vpr is estimated based on the historical measurements, whenever there is
a sudden change in the system state between successive time slots, the difference
||v − vpr|| can become large and result in FPs. In the simulations presented in Sec-
tion 7.3, we observe that when one or more trains in the TPS change status from
tractioning mode to breaking mode, there is a large change in the TPS system state.
To assess the performance of the proposed detectors, we examine their receiver oper-
ating characteristics (ROC) curve, obtained by varying the BDD’s detection threshold
τ, and the adaptive parameter of the SAD algorithm α. Each value of the parameter τ
(and α) yields certain FP and MD rates, which are the x and y-axes of the ROC curve,
respectively. We consider three levels of the measurement noise by varying its stan-
dard deviation from 0.1% to 0.3% of the full-scale current and voltage sensor readings.
We consider two different attacks: (i) In Fig. 7a and Fig. 7b, we plot ROC curves for
attacks designed without imposing the BDD-passing condition (we refer to it subse-
quently as random attack). In particular, we inject an additive attack of 20 V to the
voltage measurement of node 2. (ii) In Fig. 7c and Fig. 7d, we plot the ROC curves for
BDD-stealthy attacks.
The ROC curves under the two attacks exhibit different characteristics, which can
be explained as follows. As evident from Fig. 7a and Fig. 7c, the BDD is effective in
detecting random attacks but ineffective in detecting the BDD-passing attacks (in fact,
the detection rate of BDD-stealthy attacks is 0). This behavior can be explained by the
nature of BDD’s design. Further, by comparing Fig. 7a and Fig. 7b, we can conclude
that the SAD only marginally improves the detection rate of random attacks compared
with the stand-alone BDD detector. However, when we compare Fig. 7c and Fig. 7d,
we observe that for the BDD-stealthy attacks, the presence of the SAD significantly
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Fig. 8: Analysis of SAD under random and BDD-stealthy attacks.
improves the detection rate. Specifically, the GAD detection rate is 1 (no MDs). This
shows the effectiveness of the SAD in detecting BDD-passing attacks.
To understand the performance of SAD in the two cases of random attack and BDD-
passing attack, we plot the values of J∗ and ||v − vpr|| in Fig. 8. It can be seen that for
random attacks that have been missed by the BDD, the value of ||v − vpr|| is consis-
tently lower than J∗ for all the noise instantiations, which results in MDs. In contrast,
for BDD-stealthy attacks, the value of ||v − vpr|| is greater than J∗. This is because
in the case of random attack, the attacker only manipulates the measurements from
a few sensors (and thus the difference ||v − vpr|| is not high). However, for the BDD-
stealthy attacks, the attacker must manipulate the system measurements in a coor-
dinated manner. In particular, for the system considered in the above simulations, we
observe that the attacker must manipulate the current and voltage measurements of
all the nodes. Consequently, the difference ||v − vpr|| is high.
The FP and MD rates in the above examples are illustrated for a fixed TPS topol-
ogy and parameters. The above discussions give basic understanding on the impact of
random measurement noises on the performance of the attack detectors. However, as
the trains change their positions and the status of motion, the TPS parameters change
and consequently the FP and MD rates may vary. For instance, the practical GAD de-
tector can have a high FP rate when one or more trains in the TPS changes its status
of motion. In order to ensure that the proposed detectors have acceptable performance
in these scenarios, in Section 7.3, we present an adaptation mechanism for the GAD
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Fig. 9: (a) System set-up for simulations. Sub - Substations, TS - Train stations, W -
Trains departing from the west, E - Trains departing from the east. (b) Train speed
(top plot), position (middle plot), power demand, and regeneration capacity (bottom
plot) over time. Power demand is negative and regeneration capacity is positive.
detector, which we call GAD with attack detection window (GAD-W). Extensive simu-
lation results show that the GAD-W detector yields consistently low FP and MD rates
for the varying TPS configurations.
We end this section by explaining the introduction of the scaling parameter α in
Step 4 of Algorithm 1. Note that in the absence of measurement noise, for a TPS system
under attack, the value of J∗ is equal to ||v−vpr|| whenever there are only two discrete
solutions that satisfy the BDD-passing condition (since the attacker must choose the
solution that is different from the true measurements as his attack vector). In such
a scenario, the fluctuations in the value of J∗ due to sensor measurement noises can
often drive its value to greater than ||v − vpr||, leading to a high MD rate. In order to
avoid this, we scale down the value of J∗ by a parameter α ∈ [0, 1]. We note that this
problem is unique to the case when there are only two discrete solutions that satisfy
the BDD-passing condition, and hence no scaling of J∗ is needed in the other cases.
7. SIMULATIONS
Our analyses in the previous sections address a particular time instant only. In this
section, we conduct time-domain simulations with realistic running profiles of trains
to illustrate the impact of FDI attacks. We also show the effectiveness of the BDD in
reducing the impact of the attacks, and that of the SAD in detecting those attacks that
are BDD-stealthy.
7.1. Simulation Settings and Methodology
As Fig. 9a illustrates, we simulate a TPS consisting of four trains (labeled W1, W2, E1,
and E2), four substations (labeled Sub1 to Sub4), and six train stations (labeled TS1
to TS6). The parameters of the TPS are identical to those in Table IV. The positions
of the substations and the train stations are shown in Fig. 9a. The trains W1 and W2
start their journeys from TS1 and travel from west to east, whereas the trains E1 and
E2 start their journeys from TS6 and travel from east to west. The trains W1 and E1
depart at time zero and the trains W2 and E2 depart at the 170th second. At each of the
train stations, the trains stop for a duration of 20 seconds. Each train follows the same
speed profile as shown in the top part of Fig. 9b. The second plot of Fig. 9b shows the
trains’ positions over time. Each train switches between traction and braking modes
during the simulation, and its power demand and regeneration capacity over time are
shown in the bottom plot of Fig. 9b. This plot is derived based on mechanical energy
consumption of the train under the specified running profile, and with an efficiency
ratio of 70% for the traction mode [Shuai et al. 2015] and 40% for the braking mode
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[Acikbas and Soylemez 2007] of converting kinetic energy into electrical energy. We
simulate the TPS for 800 seconds at a time granularity of one second.
To simulate attacks, the attacker injects an attack vector computed using the meth-
ods given in Sections 4 and 5 every second. In the absence of BDD, the attacker compro-
mises the voltage and current measurements of all the train nodes. In the presence of
BDD, the attacker tampers with the voltage and current measurements of all the train
and substations nodes as well as the position information of the train nodes. The posi-
tion information of substations cannot be compromised since their locations are fixed
and known a priori. The maximum errors that the attacker can introduce to the volt-
age, current, and position measurements, as described in (12), (13), and (17), are set
as ∆Vi = 50 V, ∆Ii = 200 A, for i ∈ Na, unless otherwise specified. The choice of these
parameters is made taking into account two practical considerations: (i) the measure-
ment noise level (whose standard deviation is considered to be ≈ 0.5% of the full-scale
voltage and current sensor readings [Smitt 2016]) (ii) the change in voltage and cur-
rent measurements of the TPS between any two successive simulation instants (which
be observed to be in the considered range based on extensive simulations). Note that
if the variation of voltage and current is within this range, they pass the data-quality
checks.
The simulations are carried out in MATLAB. The constrained optimization problems
are solved using the fmincon function of MATLAB with the MultiStart algorithm. In
the absence of attack, to compute the system state, we use the fmincon with a constant
objective function and the electrical models and trains’ local control laws presented
in Section 3 as the constraints. We also use the function to compute the safety attack
vectors under the heuristic approach and the optimal efficiency attack vectors. If at
any time instant, the fmincon function returns an attack vector that is the same as
the true system state, the attacker does not launch an attack, since the attack will not
have any impact. Step 2 of the SAD algorithm is also implemented using the fmincon
function.
Although our analysis in this paper is general and applicable to a TPS network of
arbitrary size and topology, for simulations we consider a small-scale TPS in Fig. 9a.
The rationale is two fold. First, the attacker may find it difficult to coordinate his
attacks on a large number of geographically distributed trains. Computing resources
may present another barrier for large-scale attacks. A more credible scenario is for the
attacker to focus on one or a few trains in a TPS section. Second, since real-world TPS
networks are mostly radial [Abrahamsson 2012], the impact of a focused and localized
attack will not propagate over long distances. In view of these factors, we use the
small-scale TPS to represent well a TPS section in a large system.
Moreover, to simplify our simulations, we do not consider overcurrent control. Specif-
ically, we set the triggering threshold V Tri,min to a low value, so that overcurrent control
will not be activated. As a result, the trains’ speed profiles will not change because
the trains need not curtail their power consumption. At any time instant, therefore,
a train’s power consumption is equal to its power demand during acceleration. Be-
cause of this simplification, we do not simulate attacks on tractioning trains, which
would alter the tractioning trains’ power consumption and change their running pro-
files. Although we can simulate overcurrent control and attacks on tractioning trains
by extending our simulator to admit changeable running profiles, the simulations re-
ported in this paper already provide interesting understanding and insights into the
impact of attacks and the effectiveness of countermeasures.
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Fig. 10: Effect of efficiency attacks on Train E1. Circled regions highlight the time
slots where the two curves (with and without attack) diverge. Note that the curve with
attack follows the curve without attack more closely in the presence of BDD.
7.2. Simulation Results
7.2.1. Efficiency Attacks. The first set of simulations evaluates the impact of efficiency
attacks on the TPS without BDD. Fig. 10a shows the power absorbed/injected by the
train E1 in the presence and absence of attacks. We can see that the efficiency attacks
cause the regeneration trains to inject less power into the power network (please see
the encircled regions, e.g., from 302th to 315th second for the train E1). To calculate
the loss in system efficiency, we ignore the time instants when all the trains are in
traction mode, since we do not simulate attacks on the tractioning trains as discussed
in Section 7.1. As a result, the efficiency attacks cause a reduction of 28.3% in the total
energy adsorbed by the substations compared with the case of no attacks, during the
time periods when there is at least one regenerating train under attack.
The second set of simulations evaluates the impact of efficiency attacks on the TPS
with BDD. Similar to Fig. 10a, Fig. 10b shows the power absorbed/injected in the ab-
sence and presence of attacks. It can be seen that in Fig. 10 (b), the curve for the power
absorbed/injected by trains in the presence of attacks follows that for the absence of
attacks more closely, in comparison to the respective curves in Fig. 10 (a). (Please see
the encircled parts of the two figures.) Thus, although the efficiency attack can still
induce the regenerating trains to inject less power to the power network, it causes a
reduction of 6.2% only in the total energy adsorbed by the substations, during the time
periods when there is at least one regenerating train under attack. This is in contrast
to the 28.3% for the TPS without BDD.
We also examine the effect of efficiency attacks on the TPS with BDD under dif-
ferent settings of ∆si and ∆Vi in Fig. 11a and Fig. 11b, respectively. From these fig-
ures, we can see that at smaller settings of ∆si and ∆Vi, the efficiency loss caused by
the FDI attack diminishes. For instance, the efficiency loss is as low as 1.37% when
∆si = 0.1 km. In practice, the TPS monitor can estimate the present train position
based on the train’s speed and its position at the previous time instant when it was
known that there were no attacks. The present position reading can be compared with
the estimated position using (17). The setting of ∆si should consider natural errors of
train positioning systems and the estimation error. Existing train positioning systems
such as GPS and Balise can achieve an accuracy of five to ten meters [The Economic
Times – Railways 2012], [Hartwig et al. 2006]. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that
the combined effect of the train positioning system error and the estimation error is
less than 0.1 km. Our results show that by properly tuning the BDD’s attack detec-
tion parameters (e.g., ∆si and ∆Vi), the efficiency loss caused by FDI attacks can be
significantly reduced.
7.2.2. Safety Attacks. We conduct two sets of simulations to evaluate the impact of
safety attacks on the TPS: the first one without BDD and the second with BDD. Under
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Fig. 11: Effect of efficiency attacks on the TPS with BDD under different settings of
∆si and ∆Vi.
Table V: Time duration while the TPS experiences safety breaches under different
settings of ∆si in the presence of BDD.
∆si (km) No BDD 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
Time duration with safety breaches (second) 8 4 1 0 0 0
safety attacks, the regenerating trains inject more power into the power network than
that under no attacks, resulting in increased voltages. We say that the TPS experiences
a safety breach when at least one node in the TPS experiences a safety breach.
Table V summarizes the time durations of safety breaches under the two sets of
simulations. We consider BDD with different settings of ∆si. It can be observed that
without BDD, the TPS experiences safety breaches for a total of eight seconds. The
prolonged overvoltage may cause safety incidents. However, with BDD we see that,
when ∆si is in the range of 0.1 km to 0.3 km, the attack causes no safety breaches
during the simulation. As discussed previously, the setting ∆si = 0.1 km is appropriate
in practice. Hence, this set of results shows that by appropriately setting the BDD
parameters, safety breaches can be nearly eliminated.
7.2.3. SAD Algorithm. The last set of simulations evaluates the effectiveness of SAD in
detecting attacks that have bypassed the BDD. In this set of simulations, we set α = 1
(since the scaling is not necessary in the absence of measurement noise). Furthermore,
we use p = 2 in our evaluations.4 For each time instant, among the discrete solutions
to the BDD bypass condition discussed in Section 5.3, the attacker tactically chooses
the one closest to the true system state in the sense of p-norm distance. We compare
our practical approach where the vpr is the nodal voltage vector at the previous time
instant (cf. Algorithm 1), with an oracle approach where the vpr is the nodal voltage
vector at the present time instant in the absence of attack. For the oracle approach,
we observe that the ||v˜ − vpr||p is consistently higher than the J∗ for the entire simu-
lation. This suggests that the oracle approach can detect the onset of a BDD-stealthy
attack launched at any time instant. For the practical approach, we observe that the
||v˜ − vpr||p is higher than the J∗ for 96% of the simulation time. For the remaining
4% of simulation time, the practical approach will miss the attack onset because of a
significant change of v from the previous time instant to the present. This shows that
the practical approach can detect the attack onset with a high detection probability.
We note that as the size of the TPS increases (in terms of the number of trains and
substations under consideration), the number of constraints for the SAD algorithm
as well as the solutions to the BDD-passing constraints will increase. Implementing
4Simulation results conducted with p = 2 and p =∞ yielded similar performance of the SAD algorithm (in
terms of the attack detection rate).
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Fig. 12: FPs and MDs of the GAD. τ = 16 and α = 0.9.
the SAD algorithm may become computationally complex. However, as we pointed out
earlier, it is often sufficient to consider only a small section of TPS for security analysis.
Thus, in practical application, the computational overhead of the SAD algorithm will
be acceptable.
7.3. Simulation Results With Random Sensor Measurement Noises
In this subsection, we examine the empirical FP and MD rates of the GAD at different
time instants of the 800 second simulation interval. To compute these quantities, we
run N simulation runs. We let ZGAD,i(t) and ΞGAD,i(t) denote the indicator variables
representing FPs and MDs at a time instant t ∈ {1, . . . , 800} during the simulation
run i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The empirical FP and MD rates at time t are then computed as
PFP(t) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 ZGAD,i(t), PMD(t) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 ΞGAD,i(t). In our simulations, we set N =
1000 and the noise level to 0.3% of the full-scale voltage and current sensor readings.
The BDD detection threshold τ is set to 16, and α = 0.9 for the SAD. The value of α
was tuned numerically by observing observing the values of ||v˜ − vpr||p and J∗ in the
scenario when the BDD-passing constraint has only two solutions. The chosen value
of α is sufficient to eliminate MDs.
Fig. 12a shows the FP rate of the GAD, and Figs. 12b and 12c show the MD rates
of the GAD for random and BDD-stealthy attacks. For random attacks, we inject an
additive attack of 20 V to the voltage measurement of the leftmost train (in Fig. 9a).
We make the following observations. First, we observe that the FP and MD rates fluc-
tuate over time, since the TPS topology and parameters change. (Recall that the TPS
topology and parameters depend on the position and the power drawn/injected by the
trains.) Second, we observe that under the considered settings, both the oracle and
practical GAD detectors yield very low MD rates at all time instants. Thus we con-
clude that by appropriately tuning the parameters of the BDD and SAD detectors (τ
and α), the MD rate of the GAD can be reduced to a very low value. Third, we observe
that while the FP rate is low for most of the simulation interval, there are a few time
instants at which the FP rate is relatively high, particularly for the practical GAD de-
tector (e.g., from t = 497 to t = 511, the FP rate ≈ 0.2). Furthermore, we observe that
these time instants correspond to when one or more trains change their motion status
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from tractioning to braking mode, thus resulting in a drastic change in the system
state. Recall that an accelerating train draws power from the network resulting in a
voltage drop whereas as a braking train injects power resulting in a voltage raise. In
these cases, the difference ||v − vpr|| can be high for the practical GAD detector since
vpr is estimated only based on the historical values.
However, in practice, an extremely low FP rate is desired, since otherwise the sys-
tem operator would have to frequently initiate unnecessary mitigation that may be
disruptive. Thus, in what follows, we propose an adaptive version of the GAD, which
we call GAD with attack detection window (GAD-W). GAD-W will give an extremely
low FP rate in the presence of sensor measurement noises.
7.3.1. GAD with Attack Detection Window. The GAD-W detector applies an AND rule to
fuse the detection results in an attack detection window, i.e., instead of declaring the
presence of an attack based on a single alarm, GAD-W waits for consecutive alarms
over several time slots before declaring it. In the following, we first formally state the
GAD-W detector and then provide the intuition behind its design. Denote by AGAD(t) ∈
{0, 1} the detection result of the GAD at time t and by W ∈ N the window size. The
GAD-W detector raises an alarm only if there is an alarm at all the time instants
within the attack window, i.e.,
AGAD-W(t) = AGAD(t) ∧AGAD(t+ 1) ∧ · · · ∧AGAD(t+W − 1). (21)
The rationale is that in the absence of attacks, the occurrence of GAD alarms can be
due to two factors: (i) the fluctuations of BDD residual induced by the measurement
noise, or (ii) a drastic change in the system state between consecutive time slots. In
the above two cases, the BDD and SAD will raise an alarm, respectively. The first case
is a randomly occurring event (due to noise) and the second is a sparsely occurring
event. Thus, the probability of having consecutive GAD alarms over a time window
is low. Fig. 12d confirms this hypothesis, in which we plot the GAD alarms for one
instantiation of the 800 second simulation interval in the absence attacks. It can be
seen that the occurrence of alarms is sparse. Thus, the AND fusion rule in an attack
detection is effective.
A larger window size W can lower the probability of consecutive alarms within the
detection window, resulting in a lower FP rate. However increasing the window size
may lead to higher MD rates when an attack is present. Moreover, it also introduces
longer delay in detecting the attacks. Thus, the setting of the optimal window size
should balance between the FP and MD rates. In what follows, we present simulation
results to show the variations of FP and MD rates for different window sizes, which
will guide the setting of the window size.
Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 show the FP and MD rates for GAD-W detector under both ran-
dom and BDD-stealthy attacks. We observe that as the window size increases, the FP
rate decreases, whereas the MD rate increases, for the random attacks. We observe
that for a window size of 3, the average FP rate is 9 × 10−4. The average MD rate for
the random attack is 7× 10−4. Such extremely low of FP and MD rates are acceptable
under practical scenarios. Finally, we observe that the MD rates for the BDD-stealthy
attacks are very low both under the oracle and practical GAD detectors. This is because
the SAD detector is specifically designed to detect BDD-stealthy attacks.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied FDI attacks on train-borne sensor measurements used in
railway TPSes. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first effort that has studied
TPSes from a cybersecurity perspective. To account for the safety-criticality of TPS,
we adopted the Kerckhoffs’s principle and addressed two fundamental problems of
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Fig. 13: FP and MD rates for oracle GAD detector under random attacks.
importance, namely, characterization of the impact of FDI attacks on TPSes, and de-
velopment of detection techniques for these attacks. We formulated and analyzed the
efficiency and safety attacks that aim to minimize the system energy efficiency and
breach system safety conditions, respectively. To detect these attacks, we proposed a
global detection system that serializes the proposed BDD and SAD algorithms, both
of which may be implemented at a central TPS monitor. Furthermore, we proposed an
adaptive GAD-W detector that achieves a very low FP rate in the presence of noisy
sensor measurements. Our simulation results verified the susceptibility of the TPS
setup to the FDI attacks, but these attacks can be detected effectively by the proposed
global detection system.
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Appendix A: BDD Threshold
In this Appendix, we present how to set the BDD threshold τ to ensure that the false
positive rate is maintained at a certain level.
Recall that the expression for BDD residual is given by r = ||z − Hvˆ||, where z =
Hv + n, vˆ = (HTΣH)−1HTΣz. Substituting the expression of vˆ, we obtain:
r = ||z−H(HTΣH)−1HTΣz||
= ||Hv + n−H(HTΣH)−1HTΣ(Hv + n)||
= ||(I− Γ)n||, (22)
where Γ = H(HTWH)−1HTΣ. From (22), r follows a chi-square distribution, since the
noise n is Gaussian. To maintain a certain FP rate α, the BDD threshold can be set by
solving P(r ≥ τ) = α.
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